‘Religious’ Radicalism
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Abstract
This chapter provides an overview of some historical struggles against domination that are based in ‘radical religious’ communities. From indigenous peoples to Plowshare and Womanist activists, there is a considerable variety of people working together and drawing from their ‘religious’ faith to resist hierarchy and injustice. They also share many characteristics with their ‘non-religious’ counterparts. Yet what qualifies as ‘religious’ and ‘radical’ is very open to interpretation, and typical interpretations of ‘religion’ in particular often betray a colonial mindset which this chapter seeks to problematise. The chapter therefore introduces a deliberately broad range of examples including indigenous traditions, non-violent alternatives within dominant orders, and marginalised people organising new life stories. By presenting this sample and making the case for a wide definition of ‘religion’, this chapter raises questions about how analytical categories are conceived whilst also offering some reflections on different types of groups whose visions, practices, and holistic worldviews contest dominant orders.

Introduction
I believe in a religion that believes in freedom. Any time I have to accept a religion that won’t let me fight a battle for my people, I say to hell with that religion.

Malcolm X (1970: 142)
As long as there has existed hierarchy and domination, the oppressed have engaged in resistance and sustained egalitarian relationships in the face of such domination. However, what qualifies as ‘radical’ resistance, as ‘religious’ relationships, or as ‘religious radicalism’ depends on the perspective of the observer. For instance, ‘religious radicalism’ might describe either a ‘radicalism’ in the sense of an extreme position (on any number of issues) which also has ‘religious’ attributes, or a ‘religious’ claim which also happens to come across as ‘radical’ (in the sense of more extreme, more deeply passionate and committed than common examples). Indeed, the semantic coverage of both ‘religious’ and ‘radical’ overlaps where both can be taken to mean a certain kind of zeal or passionate commitment.¹

Turning to etymology does not narrow and sharpen the focus a great deal either: ‘radical’ points to the roots (Latin radicalis and radix = roots), hence a ‘radical movement’ could be taken to refer to a movement that seeks to change something at its root rather than merely superficially; and ‘religion’ is often considered to refer to something that socially binds people together (Latin religare = to bind together) as opposed to something that atomises social groups into individuals each out for their own self-centred gain. Taken together, this would seem to point to ‘religious radicalism’ as referring to a deep-rooted commitment to something which binds people together. However, etymology can be interpreted in different directions, too. For instance, ‘religion’ could be read as pointing to a binding obligation with God. The etymology of ‘religion’ is also quite contested: some argue it derives from re-legere = to read again. Clearly, therefore, ‘religion’ and ‘radicalism’ are both slippery terms.
It is therefore not surprising that studies ostensibly addressing ‘religious radicalism’ have focused on very different kinds of examples depending on the inclination of the scholar. For instance: some scholars have focused on U.S.-based movements such as Christian Identity, neo-Nordic pagans, Children of Noah, and the Anti-Cult Movement (Kaplan 1997), as well as on Islamists in the Middle East such as the Taliban, Hezbollah, and Hamas (Berman 2009); some have posited ‘religious radicals’ in contrast to ‘religious conservatives’ and ‘religious liberals’ in a U.S. context (Dreger and Adkins 1991); others speak of a ‘radical conservative socialist’ Buddhism in Thailand (Zöllner 2014); and others still have discussed examples of ‘religious radical’ individuals and groups that are largely anti-racist, anti-capitalist, and/or broadly aligned with anarchist critiques of dominant orders (McKanan 2011, Raboteau 2016).

Partly due to limited space and partly mindful of the types of radicalism discussed in this volume, this chapter focuses on the latter among the above categories: groups which can be described as both ‘religious’ and ‘radical’ in the sense of anti-oppression and anti-hierarchical, and which have presented fundamental challenges to dominant social orders (Christoyannopoulos 2009, Wiley 2014). This includes fairly predictable examples such as Christian or Muslim ‘radicals’, but not to be overlooked are also Indigenous, communal, and so-called ‘primitive’ cultures that pose challenges to the dominant order. That such Indigenous traditions and philosophies often contain a ‘religious’ element is both a factor in their frequent neglect and a reason why they deserve a central role in discussions of ‘religious radicalism’. Clearly, however, discussions of ‘religious radicalism’ could justifiably be expanded to include a
broader variety of fairly different ‘radical’ and ‘religious’ phenomena. Here, we contribute to such discussions with only a small selection.

One of the aims of this chapter, therefore, after providing a critical overview of the concepts of ‘religion’ and ‘radicalism’ and in particular after settling on a broader understanding of ‘religion’, is to present a number of examples of what might be characterised as ‘religious radicals’ that stand in opposition to hierarchy and oppression. Three types of examples are considered: Indigenous traditions which stand as radical alternatives to colonial orders (e.g., Tonga, BaMbuti, Lakota, etc.); non-violent currents within dominant regimes that challenge central pillars of those regimes such as the military, property, or hierarchy (e.g., Catholic Workers, Plowshares, and liberation theologians); and marginalised people in the process of negotiating alternative life-organising stories within nation-state contexts (e.g., the Zapatistas, the MOVE Organization, and Womanists). In presenting these examples, our second aim is to inform reflections on the following questions: what is radical about these groups of ‘religious radicals’; what are their principal concerns; how are their views and activism theorised; and what, if any, influences are active in the movements under discussion?

Underlying our presentation of these examples is an argument that what is most interesting with these groups and their ideas is not whether or not they qualify as ‘religious’ or even ‘radical’, but the degree to which their visions, practices, and holistic worldviews contest dominant orders with principles of egalitarianism, non-violence, and inclusive diversity. That is, arguably the
most ‘radical’ examples put forward a way of seeing and being in the world which provides an alternative to dominant orders which can be described as ontological, deep-rooted and total.

**Problematising definitions**

The implication behind the title of this chapter is that there is a subset of ‘radicalism’ which is appropriately labelled ‘religious’. It seems pertinent to start by unpacking some of the problems with some of the assumptions that underlie such a label – assumptions that arguably are widespread among many of the likely readers of this book. In exploring these assumptions, we seek to open up the landscape by putting forward a perspective premised on a number of arguments which are often overlooked in mainstream social and political science. Given our limited space, we cannot resolve all the issues that this gives rise to here, but at least we can give a taster to angles of analysis which are likely to be unfamiliar to many Western commentators.

There are at least four claims which our limited discussion of definitions hopes to substantiate to some extent. It is worth spelling them out at the outset to clarify our main positions. Firstly, there is an anti-‘religious’ bias in Western thinking which stems partly from an ideological framing (or at any rate a simplistic categorisation) of ‘religion’. Secondly, this bias was co-constituted, both historically and philosophically, in tandem with European colonialism. Thirdly, closer attention to much of what was excluded in the process uncovers countless examples of ‘religious radicalism’, indeed a long history of resistance to colonialism, oppression and hierarchy. Fourthly, Western categories and assumptions about ‘religion’ therefore need unpacking, especially by ‘radicals’ opposed to colonial and neo-colonial hierarchies and institutions.
‘Religion’

The term ‘religion’ is particularly problematic. This is in large part because of the assumption, arguably implicit in some of our own use of the term above, that there exists something called ‘religion’ as distinct from ‘politics,’ ‘law,’ ‘science,’ or ‘culture’. This is a distorting lens in a vast majority of cases. Not only is such an assumption unique to European languages, but it was not a common assumption even in Europe prior to the 1700s (Cavanaugh 2009, Dubuisson 1998/2003, Fitzgerald 2007, Josephson 2012, McCutcheon 2003). The now widespread notion that there is a sphere of life that can be identified as ‘religion’ and separated from other spheres of life is a product of the modern, colonial European mindset: both colonialism and this framing of ‘religion’ as a separate sphere occurred in the same era, for overlapping purposes and due to interlinking causes. Fitzgerald goes even further when he writes that ‘[t]he ideology of religious studies’, that is, as a separate sphere of study, ‘defines both modernity and colonial consciousness’, a consciousness which he explains is then reproduced each time we frame our analysis through its terminology (2007: 26).

Although scholars and laypersons outside of religious studies often use the term ‘religion’ as if there were some self-evident meaning, there is no consensus among religious studies scholars (nor legal scholars, for that matter) on how to define it or even which traditions and groups might be considered ‘religious.’ Depending on the scholar or study, anything from football clubs to Buddhist meditation, from Star Wars fans to Labour Party activism may or may not be regarded as ‘religious.’ Besides, the exact definition and limits of ‘politics’ has also evaded scholarly
consensus (is it based on power, conflict-resolution, distribution of resources, territorial sovereignty, appointment of decision-makers, and/or organising public values?). Yet the casual assumption that ‘politics’ and ‘religion’ are clearly definable and best kept separate is entrenched both in the mainstream public discourse and among many academics.

Furthermore, it is commonly accepted by scholars that ‘most people in the world are religious’ (Graham and Haidt 2010; Johnson 2010; Randal and Argyle 2005).² If one were to follow this line of thinking, assume that ‘radicals’ are fairly evenly spread across the planet, and furthermore assume that ‘radicalism’ does not preclude ‘religiosity’, then it would follow that many, if not most, ‘radicals’ would also likely be ‘religious’. Without consensus on how ‘religion’ is defined this admittedly does not tell us much, except perhaps that ‘anti-religious’ leftists would be mistaken to expect all leftists to be non-religious or all religion to be right-wing or reactionary. There is, after all, a degree of prejudice and bias against people who identify as ‘religious’ (or seem to do so) in some leftist contexts. Prejudice need not be accurate to be real and to lead to concrete bias. Just as Islamophobia can result in violence against Sikhs who are mistaken for Muslims, ‘anti-religious’ prejudice can lead to bias against persons and traditions regardless of whether or not they are ‘religious’ and regardless of whether the category of ‘religion’ is useful.

History is more complex than prejudice tends to allow. Syndicalist militias killed priests and nuns during the Spanish Civil War due to the Church’s collaboration with fascists and elites, yet, a few decades prior, Father Hagerty, a Catholic priest and revolutionary communist, wrote the preamble to the Industrial Workers of the World. Hagerty was far from a solitary example of
Christians fiercely advocating social justice and equality: Gerard Winstanley and the Levellers in 1600s England rooted their opposition to state and capital in Bible-based understandings of justice; the German Peasant rebellions of the 1520s (including the communist preacher Thomas Müntzer) and the Münster commune of the 1530s were both led by Christian revolutionaries; and radical insurrectionists Nat Turner and John Brown were both guided by their Christian faith, as were Harriet Tubman, Quakers and Unitarian Universalists such as Florence Beaumont. Other examples include Alice Herz and Norman Morrison who self-immolated in opposition to the U.S. war against Vietnam, and contemporary Christian anarchists such as the Jesus Radicals, a mainly U.S. based community coordinated through an eponymous website. Many armed anti-colonialist movements across the Muslim world were led by supposedly quietist Sufis. Prominent movement leaders, such as Zeinab al-Ghazali, Malcolm X, and Mohandas Gandhi, were rooted in faith communities of active resistance. Across the world today, people in faith communities are leading struggles against colonial orders, corporate power, and state persecution. Not only does stereotyping ‘religion’ tend erroneously to position so-called ‘believers’ on the ‘right/authoritarian’ end of the ideological landscape, it conceptually ignores all non-state cultures, traditions, and philosophies outside this landscape. We wanted to avoid the same tendencies furthermore narrowing the parameters of scholarship on ‘radicalism’.

Critics have argued that many European anarchists, in other words even those who are among the more receptive to non-state cultures, also have this blind spot, not noticing the ‘religion’ in those they feel affinity for, and instead locating it elsewhere. In other words, even anarchists can struggle to think outside the dominant framing of ‘religion’ inherited from colonialism and the
Enlightenment, obsessing instead about one particular kind of ‘religion’ they want to
passionately oppose (see, for instance, Lagalisse 2011). Among many European anarchists, the
Enlightenment as a philosophical starting point and set of assumptions about ‘civilisation’ has
been taken for granted despite the underlying colonial relations that facilitated developments
such as ‘rationality’ and ‘freedom’ (Fiscella 2015). Furthermore, their very conception of
‘religion’ (see, for example, Bakunin’s *God and the State* which took statist variants of
Protestantism and Roman Catholicism as prototypical of ‘religion’), has been conceptually
rooted in worldviews constructed by white colonialist-era philosophers. That is why political
scientist Cedric Robinson, for example, criticised European anarchists for not actually
envisioning a new society but merely ‘rearranging the ideas of that bourgeois society’ (Robinson
1980: 215).³ As H. L. T. Quan, political theorist and filmmaker, put it: ‘despite its claim of
heresy, anarchism in the West remains faithful and obedient to the ontologies and life-worlds
that gave birth to it’ (2013: 125).

In contrast to European anarchist thought, Robinson pointed to non-European examples of
anarchist praxis. One example of such praxis might be Rastafarians who advocate ‘radical
freedom and liberty of the individual’ on the one hand and ‘a strong sense of collectivism,
communalism and community [and] anti-capitalist, anti-materialist ethos’ on the other (Barnett
2002: 54). Robinson himself specifically cited the stateless Tonga as a case of non-European
anarchist praxis. To follow the Tongan example, according to Robinson, would imply the
dismantling of political authority and replacing it with systems of interconnectedness,
inclusivity, mythology, kinships, brotherhoods, and sisterhoods and ‘perhaps, with an authority
which identified order and responsibility in terms of the indivisibility of things’ (1980: 200). Yet typically, that which has been translated into European languages as ‘religion’ (and as a consequence been dismissed or overlooked by anti-religious critics) has encompassed for Indigenous peoples the entirety of life – including governance and social relations in general. As Native American studies scholar Jack Forbes wrote:

The life of Native American peoples revolves around the concept of sacredness, beauty, power and relatedness of all forms of existence. In short, the ethics or moral values of Native people are part and parcel of their cosmology or total world view. Most Native languages have no word for ‘religion’ and it may be true that a word for religion is never needed until a people no longer have it. … Religion is, in reality, living. Our religion is not what we profess, or what we say, or what we proclaim; our religion is what we do, what we desire, what we seek, what we dream about, what we fantasize, what we think – all of these things – twenty-four hours a day. One’s religion, then, is one’s life, not merely the ideal life but the life as it is actually lived. Religion is not prayer, it is not a church, it is not theistic, it is not atheistic, it has little to do with what white people call ‘religion’. It is our every act. If we tromp on a bug, that is our religion; if we experiment on living animals, that is our religion; if we cheat at cards, that is our religion; if we dream of being famous, that is our religion … the massive federal center for experimentation with animals on Staten Island is a church, the Pentagon and CIA complexes near Washington, DC, are churches, etc. Many people often pretend that they can escape from the consequences of their own
acts, but Native philosophy teaches differently. (2008 [1979]: 15-16, italics in original)

In order to reconcile such a broad-ended and anti-colonialist approach to defining ‘religion’ with the academic quest for a precise and coherent use of terms, we conceive of ‘religion’ in this broad sense as subsumed under the category of ‘life-organising stories’ – all partial and holistic narratives as well as cognitive frameworks that are used to orient individuals and groups in relation to the world and one another. This would include everything from Catholic meditation to Buddhist sacraments, but also anything from academic rituals to electoral procedures, from astrophysics to children’s fairy tales. This broader understanding of the ‘religious’ therefore opens up the landscape of ‘religious radicalism’ to examples we will be considering further below.

Three important points here are worth noting. Firstly, what is interesting is not whether or not a story is falsifiable but the ways in which any given story helps people organise and orient themselves (and their stories) in relation to one another. That is, the claim of ‘scientific’ stories versus ‘superstitious’ stories obscures the more interesting dynamics of how inter-related stories sustain certain social orders. Secondly, the claim that a story is ‘religious’ does not provide much explanatory power about life choices. In other words, it may be easy to divide people into categories of ‘religious’ and ‘non-religious’ or ‘Muslim’ versus ‘Buddhist’ but the labels do not necessarily tell us anything at all. For example, French-Lebanese author Amin Maalouf wrote: ‘You could read a dozen large times on the history of Islam from its very beginning and you still
wouldn’t understand what’s going on in Algeria. But read 30 pages on colonization and decolonization and then you’ll understand quite a lot’ (2001: 66). Thirdly, similarly, even within stories purportedly based, for example, on the teachings of Jesus or the Buddha, we learn little by characterising them as ‘religious’ or ‘non-religious’, but we learn more by examining whether a given set of stories have been crafted, edited, and developed by elites and imperial interests or by grassroots actors who tied those stories to simpler lifestyles both different from and in opposition to domination and oppression. Subsequently, rather than asking whether or not certain life-organising stories are ‘religious’ or not, we can ask if they are connecting people to one another and to all living beings and the eco-systems we share or if they lead to and are built upon traditions of division and domination.

While this understanding of ‘religion’ is broad, it provides a base for sub-categories and greater specificity that, unlike typical understandings of ‘religion,’ can be truly ‘universal’ precisely because all cultures can relate to the idea of stories that provide central reference points for orienting individuals within that culture. The lines of distinction do not fall between ‘faith’ and ‘fact’ or ‘secular’ and ‘spiritual’ but along various genres of stories: ‘short stories’ that address only one or two aspects of life, ‘anthologies’ that bind together various narratives with themes, ‘terror stories’ that cultivate fear and distrust, ‘news stories’ that inform about social developments, ‘authoritative stories’ that expect compliance with a dominant narrative, and so on. In any case, rather than propose a stable and final definition of ‘religion’ or ‘life organising stories’, this chapter primarily aims to provide examples of groups and ideas that often get less
detailed coverage partly because of broader assumptions shared across wider ‘European’ societies about the significance of such ‘religious’ groups.

‘Radical’

The word ‘radical’ also raises difficulties. Depending on the context and assumptions of the reader, the term might evoke any number of prototypical images: a person of colour, a white person, a male, a female, a gender-queer, an Islamist, a Communist, a peace activist, an armed militant, etc. In other words, our thinking about ‘radicalism’ is shaped by socially conditioned factors and assumptions that lead us to privilege certain types of actors over others for earning the label: ‘radical’. As prominent academic voices are not representative of the population at large, the dynamics of skewed individual perspectives within academia can exclude a large number of people from the very dialogue about what might constitute social change or justice and how they ought to be strived for. In the examples we selected below, we tried to include frequently excluded voices, but we inevitably were forced to leave out many too.

The *Journal for the Study of Radicalism* might be a reasonably representative starting point for a definition given that it draws together scholars specialising in radicalism. Its approach is to loosely define ‘radical’ as ‘distinguished from “reformers”, to mean groups who seek revolutionary alternatives to hegemonic social and political institutions, and who use violent or non-violent means to resist authority and to bring about change.’ This definition might sound consistent with both common conceptions as well as the etymological source of ‘radical’ yet it belies the fact that some of the earliest uses of ‘radical’ in a political sense referred to ‘radical
reformists’, whereas today ‘radical’ and ‘reformist’ are typically considered to be opposites. Nor does radical necessarily imply anti-elitism or revolutionary inclination. For example, Noam Chomsky and others have used the term ‘radical’ to refer to corporate capitalism and its ravaging effects on democracy and social order.\(^5\) Hence, an important question could be: radical in relation to what? After all, the ‘hegemonic social and political institutions’ and ‘authority’ that radicals oppose will change according to context.\(^6\) In many cases, these changes are rooted in basic needs and responses to oppression rather than overarching theories or academic literature.

**Examples of ‘religious radicalism’**

Having now discussed some of the difficulties inherent in using terms such as ‘radicalism’ and especially ‘religious’, we can now provide a variety of examples that might qualify as ‘religious radicals’ in the sense of ‘life-organising stories’ which stand in marked contrast to dominant social orders, and in the process begin to reflect on their main concerns and the way in which they think about their radicalism. Of course, thousands of groups could have potentially been considered. The limited space means only a small selection could be listed. They were selected according to two main criteria: first, they might justifiably be considered ‘radical’ in that their ideas and practices seem to present serious epistemic and/or structural challenges to the functioning of domination and colonial/capitalist-oriented societies; and second, they might justifiably be considered ‘religious’ in the broad approach outlined by Forbes: that is their life-organising stories and social practices are interwoven with all major aspects of life including governance, the nature of existence, relationships to animals and earth, conflict resolution, ethics,
and so on. Groups and ideas were also selected according to taste: that is, we the authors, find these groups interesting and worthy of discussion.

Indigenous traditions

Many Indigenous societies include those cultures, traditions, or social contexts whose very existence, paradigms, and lifestyles function as examples of powerful ‘radical’ alternatives to dominant orders including coercive governance and competitive individualism. Centring ‘radical’ social change upon Indigenous peoples simultaneously de-centres all colonialist-based models from nation-states to anarchist theory, from banking to Das Kapital. That they are suffused by life-organising stories and cultures that position them in larger cosmologies and holistic worldviews integrated into their daily life is what would qualify them as ‘religious’ according to Forbes. If nothing else, the very question of land and ownership of the wild which is central to colonialism requires the annihilation or assimilation of Indigenous peoples and their claims to the land. Indigenous people power implies therefore a core threat to social orders built upon the legacy of colonialism.

Common principles among Indigenous communities include building small scale societies based on mutual aid, shared obligations, minimal technology and violence, and maximum harmony with surrounding eco-systems. Turnbull observes in his research on the BaMbuti in the Congo: ‘Pygmies dislike and avoid personal authority, though they are by no means devoid of a sense of responsibility. It is rather that they think of responsibility as communal’ (1968: 125). According to Turnbull, their faith was in the forest and in one another. Conflicts tended to be resolved with
a minimal amount of violence. Indeed, they had minimal technology, minimal depletion of resources, minimal bureaucracy, minimal hierarchy, and minimal destruction. Their simple living and harmony with their environment can be found in other Indigenous peoples. For example, Kate Luckie of the Wintu Nation in the 1920s is recorded to have said:

> When we build houses, we make little holes. When we burn grass for grasshoppers, we don’t ruin things. We shake down acorns and pine nuts. We don’t chop down trees. We only use dead wood. But the White people plow up the ground, pull up the trees, kill everything. The tree says, ‘Don’t. I am sore. Don’t hurt me.’ But they chop it down and cut it up. The spirit of the land hates them … Everywhere the White man has touched, it is sore. (Forbes 2008: 14)

While Indigenous peoples anywhere present a particular challenge to nation-state at the very core of their legitimacy and territorial claims, the Indigenous peoples of the United States pose a particularly strong challenge to dominant orders precisely because the pillars of dominant orders in economic, political, cultural, and military terms are located therein. In other words, the proximity of Indigenous peoples in the U.S. to the core pillars of global power marks out their ‘radicalism’ as particularly ‘radical’ in their context. Furthermore, their struggles against domination did not start in the eighteenth or nineteenth century but have been going on for far longer, and this endurance grants deeper roots to their legitimacy and to the threat they pose to the dominant order (Dunbar-Ortiz 2014). Hence, if there is a radical challenge posed to imperial
domination by Indigenous peoples, the existence, claims, and traditions of Native Americans pose a greater threat than, for example, the Saami in northern Scandinavia or even the Natives of the Basque region. This means that colonial orders have a greater interest in obscuring, obstructing, and attacking their gains – even at the level of recognition and acknowledgement (formal and informal). Russell Means, a co-organiser of the American Indian Movement, has pointed out that the very identity of Indigenous peoples (he refers to ‘American Indians’) is rooted in the European creation of such terms and that to speak accurately and indigenously one would only be able to say Oglala, Brulé, Diné, Miccosukee, etc. Thus, it takes great effort to not become Europeanised for this and other reasons. Yet once language is Europeanised, the lens through which one sees and through which discourse takes place similarly becomes Europeanised. Indigenous paradigms become eradicated in ‘indoctrination mills’ (Means’ term for ‘schools’). Subsequently, leftist ‘radicalism’ is hardly a solution: ‘Revolutionary Marxism is committed to even further perpetuation and perfection of the very industrial process which is destroying us all. … Industrialization is fine and necessary. How do they know this? Faith. Science will find a way’ (Means 1991: 76-78).

Much could also be said about the way in which much European science, anthropology in particular, imposed a colonial understanding of entire Indigenous cultures which is fragmented. The label ‘religion’ was then imposed on specific aspects fragmented out of what was a total and interconnected way of life. Indigenous studies scholar Kim Tallbear for instance remarked that the Dakota word that has been translated as ‘spirituality’ or ‘religion’ actually means ‘in relation.’ To be in relation with land, animals, and people is a very direct phenomenon that does
not necessarily imply a mystery god, belief in an afterlife, an immaterial ‘soul’, or some future salvation (and even if it did, the point is that ‘religion’ for these cultures puts relationships at the core, irrespective of specific theological beliefs). It does imply a certain stewardship and care for the relations that one maintains in life and relations that each people are dependent upon. Significantly, it implies that there is no such thing as an isolated individual. Rather, each person is part of a web of relations, an interdependency with others from which one’s personal identity cannot be disentangled.

Theoretically, the most recent development is a growing recognition within academia for the longstanding relevance of decolonial perspectives. From the popularity of Frantz Fanon’s analysis of racism and violence as essential pillars of colonialism to Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s description of how ‘scientific research is implicated in the worst excesses of colonialism’, institutions based on white academia have become increasingly critiqued from within (1999: 1). As Walter Mignolo has observed, the role of ‘religion’ is central to the cosmology of colonialism: ‘The history of knowledge-making in modern Western history from the Renaissance on will have, then, theology and philosophy-science as the two cosmological frames, competing with each other at one level, but collaborating with each other when the matter is to disqualify forms of knowledge beyond these two frames.’ (2009: 164)

While some scholars have emphasised that decolonialisation therefore begins in the mind (hooks 1994, Waziyatawin and Yellow Bird 2012), others have insisted on the centrality of land claims and Indigenous sovereignty (Tuck and Yang 2012). In either case, these are fundamental
challenges to core tenets of colonial orders (even within social justice movements such as Occupy or environmental movements which tend to conceptually ‘occupy’ Natives out of existence)⁸.

Non-violent alternatives within dominant orders

History is full of radical social change developing from people organising non-violently from with nation states or imperial societies. Within Muslim contexts one might mention Heba Raouf Ezzat’s theoretical blend of anarchism, social democracy, and Islamic civic organisation, Ali Shariati’s call for a classless society in Iran, or the weaponless ‘peace army’ of the Khudai Khidmatgars (‘servants of God’) led by Abdul Ghaffar Khan in India. Within other traditions one can mention: Thich Nhat Hahn and Engaged Buddhism; Starhawk and other pagan activists in the global justice movement; Gandhi’s Sardovaya Movement; magick traditions and gender-queering through Genesis Breyer P-Orridge and others; and activists within Transcendental and Theosophical circles such as Henry David Thoreau (who popularised the idea of civil disobedience) and Annie Besant (socialist, feminist and anti-colonialist activist). However, the focus here will be on those who have applied a very different approach to the teachings of Jesus than those who used those same teachings to enslave, conquer, and colonise.

There are many examples of such radical offshoots emerging from within Christian contexts. From the celibate Shakers led by Mother Lee to the single mother Frances Ellen Watkins Harper – simultaneously Unitarian and African Methodist Episcopal – who organised against white domination and patriarchy in nineteenth century United States, to the earliest Christians who
refused military service and shared their belongings, current-day Christian communists such as the Bruderhof, who share their wealth amongst themselves, and neo-monastics such as Shane Claiborne who choose lives of simplicity and communal living while working for social justice in poor neighbourhoods, there is a long legacy of radical Christianity that non-violently challenges interpretations of scripture that wed church power to the power of states and ruling classes (e.g., Bradstock 2002). Our focus here is on three such radical currents, all still active today: the Catholic Workers, Plowshares and liberation theologies.

The Catholic Worker movement was co-founded in 1933 by Dorothy Day and Peter Maurin. Their radical vision was to produce a cheap newspaper for ordinary people that would provide radically anti-militaristic and anti-capitalist news and establish communes in the city as well as the countryside. The urban communes or houses of hospitality would welcome the poor and homeless into their walls for food and shelter. The rural communes would provide alternatives to industrialised society as well as grow the food to be provided to their fellows in the city. Inspired by Kropotkin, Tolstoy, the Industrial Workers of the World, and the gospel of Jesus Christ, Dorothy Day set about to do what she could to resist what she described as ‘this filthy rotten system’ (Riegle 2012: 142). Yet resistance was only one part of the Catholic Worker praxis. As Peter Maurin pointed out, their mission was to help create a world in which ‘it’s easier to be good’ (ibid). Today there are more than 190 Catholic Worker communes across the world run by Catholics and non-Catholics. They continue to take part in anti-militaristic and anti-capitalist campaigns as well as prefigure communities of mutual aid and hospitality to the destitute (including refugees).
Closely associated with the Catholic Worker movement is the Plowshare movement that gained notoriety in 1980 and continues today with the specific aim of doing direct nonviolent actions against the military industrial complex. Its roots go back to the late 1960s. In particular, on 17 May 1968 nine Catholic activists broke into government offices in Catonsville, Maryland, removing hundreds of draft files, and then burning them with homemade napalm (saving all of those young men from being drafted for the war). They included the Berrigan brothers, who would later be involved in the first ‘Plowshares’ action proper: on 9 September 1980, with a group of 6 others, they trespassed onto a nuclear missile facility in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, where they damaged nuclear cones (‘turned them into plowshares’ as prophesied in the Bible) and poured blood onto various documents. There have been over 70 Plowshare actions since then. These actions have always rooted their radical opposition to the military machine in Biblical tropes, both in their theorisation of their action and in the symbolism chosen in those particular actions.

One of the most popular and widespread radical movements in Christian contexts is that of liberation theologies which, depending on your proclivity, could be traced back to Moses, Jesus Christ, Bartolomé de las Casas, the Medellín Conference of Latin American Bishops in 1968, or Chimbote, Peru earlier that same year (Gutiérrez 1988: xviii). Alternately, Gustavo Gutiérrez wrote in *A Theology of Liberation* in 1971 that liberation theologies take their root in the unjust death of countless poor and oppressed throughout history. The Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) with its modernising directives, emphasis on communal equality and support for local
autonomy certainly helped facilitate the popularisation and spread of liberation theologies throughout the world. In particular, base ecclesial communities such as the many that sprouted up in Brazil became local tools for lay people to interpret scripture out from their own needs and the ‘preferential option for the poor’ (a phrase originating among liberation theologians and repeated by Popes John Paul II and Francis). In such contexts, ‘sin’ for example is interpreted as social injustice and ‘a breach of friendship with God and others’ (Gutiérrez 1988: 24). Rather than theorising theology ‘from an armchair,’ liberation theologies expressed new ways of doing theology. In general, liberation theologies tend to be not so much theory as outgrowths of solidarity and active commitment to people who are poor and marginalised (Rowland 1999: 4). Yet written documents have played an important role as well. In 1965, Dom Hélder Camara, a bishop from Rio de Janeiro, organised a group document signed by 15 bishops from Asia, Africa, and Latin America during the end of Vatican II that described ‘the people of the Third World’ as ‘the proletariat of today’s humanity’ and insisted that ‘the gospel demands the first, radical revolution’ wherein ‘wealth must be shared by all’ (Smith 1991: 16). Many liberation theologians such as Camara and José Miranda equated Christianity with ‘true’ socialism and communism - meaning anti-racist, anti-sexist, antiauthoritarian systems of sharing the wealth. As Gutiérrez put it, ‘[t]o support the social revolution means to abolish the present status quo and to attempt to replace it with a qualitatively different one, … not only better living conditions, a radical change of structures, a social revolution; [but] much more: the continuous creation, never ending, of a new way to be human, a permanent cultural revolution.’ (emphasis in original 1988: 31, 21)
Marginalised people organising new stories

A third type of example concerns a few select groups and individuals who are drawn from marginalised peoples struggling to retain autonomy within nation states and/or create viable alternatives. Many of these people may not seem ‘radical’ in a full revolutionary sense, yet by articulating their own voice, they implicitly threaten the status quo which has consistently relegated them to the margins.

For example, Vine Deloria, Jr. was a Native American whose father and grandfather were both Episcopalian preachers and he himself acquired degrees in law, political science, and theology. At the same time, he was tremendously critical of racism and colonial dominance as well as the entire epistemological paradigm upon which European nation-states and capitalism are constructed. In Deloria’s words:

The people who maintain the structures of science, religion, and politics have one thing in common that they don’t share with the rest of society. They are responsible for creating a technical language, incomprehensible to the rest of us, whereby we cede to them our right and responsibility to think. They in turn formulate a beautiful set of lies that lull us to sleep and allow us to forget about our troubles, eventually depriving us of all rights, including, increasingly, the right to live in a livable world.

(Jensen 2008: 249)
Similarly, one might mention any number of long-standing cultures such as Bedouin or Berbers in North Africa who have maintained relatively technologically advanced societies without prisons, police, and who apply mediation and councils of elders rather than courts and governments to provide social order (see Barclay 1992). One might also see Jewish people who have historically been excluded from dominant cultures. Amnon Shapira, doctor of Bible Studies, has argued that anarchism remains embedded in Jewish scripture in a number of ways — whether in the way Jewish communities were originally egalitarian and non-centralised, in the critique of how power corrupts, in the preference for kingship of God rather than human rule, and so on. Indeed, there is hardly a shortage of historically radical Jews from Emma Goldman and Martin Buber to Noam Chomsky and Gustav Landauer. More recently, Michael Lerner of the Jewish social justice journal *Tikkun*, which has made radical calls such as for the ‘elimination of national boundaries and all restrictions on immigration’ and ‘a non-violent revolution’ including a ‘Global Marshall Plan’ requiring the wealthiest 20 countries to donate 1-2 percent of their annual GDP for the next 30 years to end global poverty (Lerner 2015: 19).

Three examples of ‘new stories’ that we shall consider in a little more depth are the Zapatistas, the MOVE Organization, and Womanist authors. The Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) appeared before the world on January 1, 1994 when they made a spectacular insurrection in the Mexican state of Chiapas. This was the same day that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had come into effect. And just as NAFTA had been many years in the making so too had the Zapatistas been training for years albeit hidden from public view. They had been not only training militarily but also democratically. They routinely held
democratic referendums with local people in Chiapas in order to be guided by their will as to
when and how an insurrection ought to take place. When people determined that the time was
right, they struck and caught the Mexican state off-guard. The Zapatistas then soon put down
their weapons, emphasising that a military showdown was not their aim. Their aims, instead,
were (and remain) peaceful autonomy for Indigenous peoples and justice for all marginalised and
poor people in the region. They see themselves as part of a global struggle against neoliberal
policies, the influence of corporate power, authoritarian party politics, and rampant racism
toward Indigenous peoples, and they want to do this from the bottom-up. As one-time
spokesman Subcomandante Marcos said:

We do not struggle to take power, we struggle for democracy, liberty, and justice.

[...] It is not our arms which make us radical; it is the new political practice which
we propose and in which we are immersed with thousands of men and women in
Mexico and the world: the construction of a political practice which does not seek the
taking of power but the organization of society. (Flood 2001)

Despite poverty and continual harassment by the Mexican state and paramilitaries, certain
regions in Chiapas have remained under Zapatista control, and have managed to flourish through
their own system of direct democracy.

Most accounts of the Zapatistas do not tend to discuss their ‘religious’ aspects. This can, in part,
be ascribed to an ‘anti-religion’ attitude among much of the Zapatista supporters in Northern
European-based cultures such as the United States and Canada. For example, Lagalisse (2011) documented a speaking tour of two Zapatistas in which the more ‘religious’ woman speaker was gradually marginalised by organisers and audiences while the more ‘secular’ male was given centre stage. Indeed, there has been much lost in translation as supporters and critics from dominant cultures looked on at evolving movements in the South, and wrote their stories in European language. Yet the approach of the Zapatistas is reminiscent of a quote by Mujeres Creando in Bolivia who stated: ‘I’ve said it [before] and I’ll say it again that we’re not anarchists by Bakunin or the CNT, but rather by our grandmothers, and that’s a beautiful school of anarchism.’ (Lasky 2008: 18) This approach is not rooted in European theory but in Indigenous terrain and tradition. It does not exclude Europeans but it does not privilege them either. Moreover, with Chiapas hosting Protestants, Catholics, Mayan traditionalists, and (more recently) Muslims in ways that constitute ‘a multifaceted complex of competing and overlapping cults’ that often include women in prominent roles (Gossen [1999] 2013: 184), describing Zapatista life-organising stories and practices is not easy. In a famous quote, Subcomandante Marcos explained his ‘true’ identity as follows:

Marcos is gay in San Francisco, black in South America, an Asian in Europe, a Chicano in San Ysidro, an anarchist in Spain, a Palestinian in Israel, a Mayan Indian in the streets of San Cristobal, a Jew in Germany, a Gypsy in Poland, a Mohawk in Quebec, a pacifist in Bosnia, a single woman on the Metro at 10 p.m., a peasant without land, a gang member in the slums, an unemployed worker, an unhappy student, and, of course, a Zapatista in the mountains. (Lasky 2008: 8)
It is characteristic of this approach that Subcomandante Marcos stated his age as ‘518’ – the number of years it had been since the beginning of European interference in the Americas. In sum, the Zapatistas managed to fuse European-based socialist activism with indigenous perspectives on direct democracy and grassroots organising.

Another example of a ‘radical’ new life-organising story is the MOVE Organization. In this case, a mixed ethnic group of urbanites espoused a lifestyle and belief that bore strong similarities to those of many Indigenous peoples with a critical view of technology, the state, economics, and dominant conceptions of ‘religion.’ MOVE was founded in Philadelphia by John Africa in the early 1970s with the aim of educating people on the evils of the ‘system’ by which they meant the entire technological complex and all that has made it possible. MOVE members also see violence against any creature (including bugs) as violence against one’s self. They were the first group in the United States to combine earth liberation and animal liberation philosophies as well as the first U.S. group to hold an animal liberation protest (in 1974, prior to the 1975 publication of Animal Liberation by Peter Singer or the 1976 formation of the Animal Liberation Front). They were violently repressed by city authorities in 1985 when Philadelphia police infamously dropped a bomb on MOVE’s row home, burning down an entire city block and killing 11 people in the process.

John Africa taught that the only legitimate government was the government of self and that all ideologies and administrations – whether liberal, communist, capitalist, fascist, or socialist –
were all hallucinations. States were depicted as gang leaders who terrorised people across the planet and MOVE’s mission was to enlighten people to this and dismantle both industry and external forms of government. True law, according to MOVE, was ‘natural law’ – provided by nature – equally applicable to all people (such as the need to breathe or drink) and eternal as opposed to laws made by humans that are constantly subject to change. Their ‘religion’, MOVE members will say, is simply life. ‘Mama Nature’ herself was God and when each of us supposedly die, the actual process is simply one of cycling back to earth.

One person who has spoken out on behalf of MOVE and against the violent actions of the police is the author, Alice Walker. Walker is also the person who, in 1983, coined the term ‘womanism’ in reference to black feminism that has some key distinctions from white feminism. Layli Phillips explained the new approach in *The Womanist Reader*:

> Womanism is a social change perspective rooted in Black women’s and other women of color’s everyday experiences and everyday methods of problem solving in everyday spaces extended to the problem of ending all forms of oppression for all people, restoring the balance between people and the environment/nature, and reconciling human life with the spiritual dimension. (Phillips 2006: xx)

The ‘spiritual dimension’ that she has articulated also happened to be very much in line with the type of philosophy articulated by John Africa. Walker has written: ‘I seem to have spent all of my life rebelling against the church or other people’s interpretations of what religion is – the
truth is probably that I don’t believe there is a God, although I would like to believe it. Certainly I don’t believe there is a God beyond nature. The world is God. Man is God. So is a leaf or a snake.’ (cited in Pinn 2012: 125-126)

This is reminiscent both of John Africa’s statement that ‘God is as common as dirt’10 and Buddhist statements about the Buddha being found in ordinary places – even dung.

Both Walker and MOVE speak of a single God in the feminine form. Both regard this single God as the essence of all existence as manifested in what most people call ‘nature’ unsullied by technology and human interventions. Both of them tie this commitment to active resistance to imperial orders and their subsequent pillars of colonialism, racism, capitalism, industrialism, and militarism.

**Reflecting on ‘religious radicalism’**

Having now evoked a broad variety of examples of ‘religious radicalism’, we can return to some of the core issues upon which each chapter in this book was invited to reflect. With regard to the questions outlined in the beginning, the first section noted that the term ‘radical’ is not unproblematic and varies according to context and observer. However, a distinction between ‘radicalism’ and ‘reformism’ has been echoed here to refer to those who are more committed to significant and holistic change of society.

Indigenous cultures and their way of life have been characterised as ‘radical’ here insofar as they threaten the dominant order by the very alternative they present to it and by continuing to survive
parallel to it. This includes entire societies whose traditions are testimony to the possibility of life without prisons, police, militaries, or bureaucracies. Their languages and traditions carry codes, values, and paradigms that bring them in inevitable and fundamental conflict with the many facets of the dominant way of life. They could be seen as ‘religious’ because they could be subject to ‘anti-religious’ bias through their use of terms such ‘God’ or ‘Great Spirit,’ their acceptance of revelation as a form of knowledge, and/or the holistic and interwoven character of their life-organising stories. The question here is not whether they are ‘religious’ or not but how ‘anti-religious’ bias, because of both its prejudiced conception of religion and its shared origins with colonialism, has often resulted in them being omitted from studies of typical ‘radicalism’. They are premised upon life-organising stories which colonial and anti-religious mindsets have a tendency to dismiss too quickly.

The other examples cited above have been regarded as ‘radical’ due to their deliberate point of departure from dominant cultures, a contestation relative to their original positionality. Moreover, because their contestation is egalitarian, anti-domination and anti-hierarchial, they are on the left of the usual political spectrum, despite being ‘religious’. For instance, with those non-violent groups who based their actions on the teachings of Jesus, what is ‘radical’ is their contestation of two major pillars of the dominant right-wing order: private property and organised violence. They are ‘religious’ in the sense that they too are subject to ‘anti-religious’ bias in the context of ‘radicalism’ due to their use of terms such as ‘God,’ their dependency upon scriptures such as Gospels, and their collaboration with or membership in institutions identified as ‘religious’ by themselves or others. These and the other examples considered above
nevertheless all exemplify ‘religious radicalism’ by raising the voices of marginalised peoples up against dominating, hierarchical and anti-egalitarian orders even as they are forced to negotiate their lives within nation states and dominant cultures.

With regard to the second question (what are the principal concerns of those movements?), given how varied a set of examples of ‘religious radicals’ we considered (and there are of course many, many more), any set of principal concerns will remain quite broad and vague about the specifics: they tend to emphasise cooperation rather than competition, egalitarianism rather than hierarchy, sharing rather than hoarding, gender and ethnic equality rather than patriarchy and white supremacy, and non-violence rather than militarism. They also share a determination to either directly (by confronting) or indirectly (by prefiguring alternatives) oppose the existing order which is perceived as unjust, violent, inauthentic and in tragic disharmony with global ecology. Finally, they are all committed to raising their own marginalised voices and/or the voices of marginalised peoples with whom they are in solidarity.

As for the third question (how their politics is theorised), the theorisation of the politics of the activism of each of those groups varies significantly from group to group. Yet in all cases there is some reference point to life-organising stories based on principles which in their eyes are larger than human-based constructs. Whether those ideas are presented as God, Life, or Earth, the stories are broader than mere anthropocentric concerns. ‘Theorisation’ here consists in large part in the affirmation and protection of these alternatives in the suffocating cacophony, repression, discrimination, and indoctrination of dominant cultures. Yet the lack of formal academic theory
is also one common trait of this type of ‘radicalism’. Emphasis on ‘theory’ can result in a shift of power towards academic scholars and the elitist language of academia. Rather than submit to the primacy of written word as a predecessor to action and societal change, many of these examples cited prioritise direct action. As John Africa of MOVE stated: ‘Application don’t need no conversation’ (Africa 1994: 1). Similarly, liberation theologians have long argued that theory is subordinate to action and that the first act for a committed theologian is not to theorise about God or politics but to take an active stand on the side of the oppressed. Still, in terms of the Catholic Workers, Plowshares, and liberation theologians, ‘theorisation’ of their activism is articulated in relation to their interpretations of the teachings of Jesus as decidedly peaceful, anti-war, anti-state, and communistic. Womanists, in turn, took their theory directly from their experience of being excluded by dominant white feminist and male anti-racist discourses.

It might be worth comparing the answers to these three questions with those of ‘radicals’ who would not typically describe themselves, or typically be described as ‘religious’. The concerns for injustice, materialism, individualism, ecology, property and state violence, to name a few, are concerns that intersect across ‘religious’ and ‘non-religious’ radicals. Whether categorised as ‘religious’ or not, radical communities tend to construct moral frameworks that challenge the roots of hegemonic violence and injustice by resisting the practical and theoretical premises upon which that order is founded. To distinguish between radicals here as ‘religious’ or not remains a problematic act which carries with it a significant dose of colonialist thinking. We do not mean to resolve this difficulty here, but merely to reiterate it and be respectful of its implications.
At the same time, those life-organising stories that might be characterised as ‘religious’ and ‘radical’ do tend to have certain general characteristics that are relevant for radical struggle. First, they tend to conceive of relational and holistic systems wherein struggle for justice is part of larger commitments and traditions. Second, they tend to utilise concepts of sacredness that transcend economic calculations – particularly in relation to the commons which provide opportunities for people and animals to fulfil their needs (water, land, air, food, etc.). Third, they often engage some sort of semiotic marker such as ‘Creator’, ‘Life’, and/or ‘God’ which seems to both facilitate holistic thinking, evoke appreciation for the sacred, manage long-term intergenerational goals, and connect each person to cosmological and social narratives that bind their identities broader identities of animal and human communities, earth, and the entirety of existence. Notably, in relation to radical struggles, these ultimate markers or signs of fundamental dedication indicate a loyalty to social and/or existential orders that are distinct from and more important than any possible loyalty to a state (and often they are antithetical to the state).

Thus ‘religious’ radicals can be described as aligning themselves with various life-organising stories that remain critical of dominant orders. They tend to display a sense of obligation to try to address this and they may demonstrate a willingness to commit significant sacrifices to that end. Again, though, much the same could be said of non-‘religious’ radicals too. Perhaps, then, instead of classifying particular groups as ‘religious’ and often paying less attention to them as a result, all ‘radicals’ might consider borrowing from the grammar of ‘religious’ radicals, working
together on common concerns, and learning patiently from each other and on an equal footing about each other’s life-organising stories and cultures.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has argued that dominant approaches to ‘radicalism’ are so embedded within dominant orders that what often qualifies as prototypical for ‘radical’ risks ignoring the ‘radicality’ of Indigenous stateless societies and matriarchal or egalitarian cultures upon whose backs and land dominant orders have generally been constructed, as well as others who might be dismissed as ‘religious’ without questioning problems inherent in the very concept of ‘religion’. This chapter has therefore conceived of ‘radicalism’ as focusing on these oft-excluded cases and placing Indigenous cultures at the core of what it means to be ‘radical’.

This chapter has also argued that ‘religion’ is a particularly problematic category especially when posed as mutually exclusive in relation to ‘politics’, an act which removes entire sets of life-organising stories and cultures from conversations about governance, power, and popular decision-making. Nor does the dichotomy between ‘religious’ and ‘non-religious’ radicals necessarily tell us much about whom we are talking about. Indeed there are as many differences *between* so-called ‘religious’ and ‘non-religious’ radicals as there are *among* members of each category. Rather than provide decisions about who is or is not a ‘religious radical’, this chapter has aimed to provide several possible examples to broaden the topic, and has queried the very terms ‘radical’ and especially ‘religious’ in order to expand the spectrum of discussion. After all,
including formerly excluded people might be precisely what should be expected from a ‘radical’
approach to research about ‘religious radicalism’.

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1 This sense of ‘radical religion’ as ‘true believer’ seems to underlie the conception applied by Jeffrey Kaplan when he has written about the topic (2016: 11).


3 Until Quan (2013), Robinson’s discussion of anarchism (1980) had been ignored by anarchist scholars and activists.

See, for example, some of Chomsky’s recent statements published on Alternet, 5 March 2013 or 5 December 2015.

Although we wrote this chapter about ‘religious radicalism’ because we have previously written about Christian anarchism (Christoyannopoulos 2010 and 2016) and Islamic anarchism (Fiscella 2009 and 2014) respectively, we decided however not to focus on our previous material (e.g., Tolstoy, taqwacore, etc.) and open up for a broader discussion about how ‘radicalism’ is conceived.

Quote taken from Kim Tallbear’s presentation on 21 March 2016 at Undisciplined Environments, the International Conference of the European Network of Political Ecology in Stockholm.

Occupy Oakland is particularly interesting in this regard in that there were more Natives involved in it than in many other Occupy sites, and Occupy Oakland was also a site where Natives were critical of the name ‘Occupy’. See, for example, Queena Kim, ‘The Campaign to “Decolonize” Oakland: Native Americans Say “Occupy” Terminology Is Offensive,’ Truthout, 28 December 2011 http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/5786:the-campaign-to-decolonize-oakland-native-americans-say-occupy-terminology-is-offensive

Drawn from Shapira’s English translation of his work in Hebrew entitled Religious Jewish Anarchism (Or: Does the Jewish Religion Sanctify State Rule?) 2013.

The author goes back to the roots of religious radicalism in the Islamic world and charts the ways it can be opposed. Having analyzed the Western political, economic, and cultural impact on the Muslim civilization he concludes that the Muslim countries stand a chance of joining the globalization process on an equal footing with others if they are able to reform public consciousness. Religious radicalism as a trend.

IN RECENT YEARS, much has been said about radicalism and its varied offshoots. True, the number of terrorist acts climbs up, the popularity of extreme right political forces grows, and the wave of left radical and anti-globalist movements, migration crises and international tension is rising. Religious Radicalism and Denialism! 

Advising to put on Ottoman Alphabet Courses for high schools and religious courses for first class of primary schools, can be approved by a large segment of society. Indeed, Islamic community in Turkey have changed very much in the last decade. Religious radicalism and violent extremism in Albania.

Address the phenomenon of religious radicalism and violent extremism beyond the security sector boundaries by actively involving state institutions and agencies operating in the areas of local governance, education, social affairs and youth, employment, anti-discrimination, etc., as well as other non-state actors, particularly the religious communities and the civil society. The actions and measures undertaken as a response by law enforcement.