This first book-length study of the international legal aspects of the dissolution of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia offers more than its title promises. In the first chapter, Radan distinguishes what he calls the ‘classical theory’ of self-determination from the ‘romantic theory’: the former defines the subject of self-determination in terms of the territory which a group inhabits, while the latter defines it, roughly speaking, in terms of a group’s cultural and ethnic traits. For the latter, the group that should ‘determine itself’ is a national one, defined in terms of its ethnicity and culture. Having drawn this distinction, Radan proceeds, in chapter 2, to examine the use of the term ‘people’ in various international legal — mostly United Nations — documents regarding the self-determination of peoples. He concludes that in these documents the term ‘people’ is not restricted to the use prescribed by the classical theory of self-determination: the reference of the term ‘people’, in the frequently recurring phrase ‘the self-determination of peoples’, is not and cannot be restricted to ‘the total population of a political unit’. The term ‘people’, Radan argues, can — and in practice, does — encompass nations or national groups. While noting that neither the texts of various UN documents nor their travaux preparatoires can offer a conclusive interpretation of this term, he lists a large number of instances in which these documents refer to a number of ‘peoples’ inhabiting a single territory. He points out that in the great majority of these, the term can be, without any difficulty, understood to refer to nations. The rival interpretation, propounded by Antonio Cassese, according to which ‘people’ refers to the entire population of a single state or colonial territory, Radan claims, is not only unsubstantiated but also inconsistent. The rival interpretation grants the right of secession to ‘a people’ but denies the status of ‘people’ to any group within a particular state. From this it follows that a people would have only the right to secede from itself. The contrary view, that ‘peoples’ include national groups within a single state, does not, however, imply that any national group within a single territorial unit or state would have the right to secession. Citing a variety of UN documents, Radan argues that a national group has the right to secede only when it is denied the right of internal self-determination in the state which it inhabits. The romantic theory of self-determination, at least its international law version, does not countenance an uncontrolled proliferation of states.

2 Ibid 66.
4 Radan, above n 1, 46–50.
Although Radan here offers a consistent and systematic interpretation of a series of UN and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (‘CSCE’),\(^5\) declarations as well as International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) judgments, his argument is open to dispute. Perhaps the most obvious question one would ask is why, if the term ‘people’ were meant to include (or at least not to exclude) various national groups within a state, do none of the documents which Radan cites explicitly say so? Why has it been left to legal scholars to haggle over the actual meaning of ‘people’ when that meaning is central to the legal interpretation of one of the most important principles of international law?

Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the application of the *uti possidetis* principle in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Here the author offers a systematic account of the historical development of the principle of *uti possidetis* from its origins as a principle in Roman law, to its adaptation as a principle of international law determining territorial changes upon the termination of war, and finally as a principle relevant to resolving boundary disputes following decolonisation, initially in Latin America and later in post-World War II Africa. Radan notes that the application of this principle to boundary dispute resolution in Latin America depended upon the agreement of all parties to the dispute. In Latin America, Radan also points out, it became quite clear that the meaning and application of *uti possidetis juris* differs considerably from that of the *uti possidetis de facto*, although both of these had been applied in the resolution of boundary disputes.\(^6\) In the *Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute*,\(^7\) concerning the borders between two former colonies in Africa, the ICJ established *uti possidetis juris* as being an obligatory rule of international law in judicial and arbitral proceedings concerning boundary disputes following decolonisation. Radan points out that the ICJ failed to substantiate this ruling, which was, soon after, also disputed by the President of the Chamber which made it.\(^8\) However, Radan admits that the ruling, restricted as it originally was to disputes between states gaining independence from the same colonial power, appears to have gained general acceptance.\(^9\)

The restricted application of *uti possidetis juris* to post-decolonisation boundary disputes provides Radan with a key premise of his argument against the rulings of the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia, established in August 1991 by the European Community.\(^10\) Commonly referred to as the ‘Badinter Commission’, in honour of its head, the French constitutional lawyer Robert Badinter, the Commission was originally set up to arbitrate among

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5 The CSCE changed its name to the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (‘OSCE’) in January 1995: Radan, above n 1, 64.
6 Radan, above n 1, 195–9.
7 *(Burkina Faso v Mali)* [1986] ICJ Rep 554 (‘Frontier Dispute Case’).
9 Radan, above n 1, 133.
the parties in conflict in Yugoslavia. In its opinions the Badinter Commission explicitly restricted the right of self-determination to the territories within each of the federal units of the Yugoslav federation, justifying this restriction by an appeal to the principle of *uti possidetis juris*. For this purpose, as Radan shows, the Badinter Commission selectively quoted the judgment in the *Frontier Dispute Case*, omitting the ICJ’s restriction of the application of the principle to the process of decolonisation. The Badinter Commission quoted from the ICJ’s judgment a statement concerning the purpose of the *uti possidetis*; namely ‘to prevent the independence and stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles’ but omitted the continuation of the statement ‘provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power.’ Elsewhere in its judgment the ICJ asserted that the principle is ‘a firmly established principle of international law where decolonization is concerned’. In Radan’s view these were not accidental omissions by the Badinter Commission. By extending the range of application of *uti possidetis juris*, he argues that the Commission was attempting to establish a principle of its own, which he dubs the ‘Badinter Borders Principle’. Pursuant to this principle, where there has been a successful secession from a state or where a state has dissolved, internal federal borders of such a state become protected international borders that cannot be changed by force. The Badinter Borders Principle was used to provide a legal basis for the international community’s decision to recognise Yugoslavia’s seceding republics as international states with borders that corresponded to previous internal boundaries in the Yugoslav federation. The case of the former Yugoslavia has since been cited as a precedent in relation to other secessionist movements, most importantly that of a possible secession of Quebec from Canada (which is likewise a federal state).

As expected, Radan argues, in chapter 7, that the Badinter Borders Principle has no basis in international law, primarily for two reasons: the principle of *uti possidetis* is restricted to decolonisation; and the right of self-determination is not (and cannot be) restricted to entire populations of territorial or federal units. While Radan’s argument in support of these claims is persuasive, it is far from conclusive. One can also argue that there is nothing in the principle itself to prevent its judicial extension to cases of border disputes other than those arising from decolonisation, and that the latter right has been, at times, successfully restricted to entire populations of territorial units. But his argument against the Badinter Commission rulings is not restricted to these two issue; it is a wide-ranging and complex argument that would be difficult to summarise adequately in a review of this kind.

It would be equally difficult to summarise Radan’s account of the constitutional development of Yugoslavia from its inception in 1918 to its

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11 Radan, above n 1, 228–9.
14 Radan, above n 1, 222.
demise, and of the series of recursive successions which took place on its
territory from 1991 to 1999, presented in chapters 5 and 6. His is an account of
all the secessions; those that were internationally recognised and those that were
not (such as the secessions of the Croat community of Herzeg-Bosna and of the
[Muslim] Republic of Western Bosnia, both from Bosnia-Herzegovina). So far
there have been nine secessions in the former Yugoslavia — four secessions of
federal and five of sub-federal units — which have led to the establishment of
separate states or state-like legal systems. There were also two proclaimed
secessions from one federal unit, Macedonia, which appeared to have been
purely declarative. In view of the diversity and complexity of these secessions,
the Badinter Commission rulings — in effect recognising only the secessions of
federal units — appear to have been motivated by a desire to find a simple legal
solution to a highly complex political problem.

Whatever the motivations of the Badinter Commission may have been, Radan
regards its rulings as ad hoc legal opinions without proper grounding in
international law. A number of legal scholars, such as Matthew Craven16 and
Steven Ratner,17 share this critical view of the Commission’s legal reasoning.

In fact the Badinter Commission’s appeal to the *uti possidetis* principle, I
think, is a result of its rather desperate search for a principle of international law
which would protect the internal borders of a state. For obvious reasons
international law provides no protection of this sort. Radan, among others, does
not see any reason why the internal borders of federal Yugoslavia necessarily
had to be protected in any way, and argues that the transformation of these
internal borders into international ones was a breach of international law; namely
that of the equal right of self-determination of peoples. The peoples in this case
were national groups, which, through a plebiscite, expressed their desire to
secede from the federal units of the former Yugoslavia.

More importantly, I believe that the Badinter Commission was neither
established, nor functioned, as an authoritative judicial body whose opinions
were to be regarded as sources of international law. Rather, the Commission
acted as an advisory body to the European Community and its institutions
regarding the recognition of the newly emerging states in the Balkans. When it
was politically expedient to do so, its advice on these matters was conveniently
disregarded. For example, acting against the Commission’s recommendations,
the European Community (preceded, unilaterally, by Germany) recognised the
independence of Croatia and refused to recognise that of Macedonia. In this way,
the European Community demonstrated that it considered the opinions of its own
Commission as neither legally binding nor authoritative.

16 Matthew Craven, ‘The European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia’
17 Steven Ratner, ‘Drawing a Better Line: *Uti Possidetis* and the Borders of New States’
In view of this, I read Radan’s closing chapter on the Badinter Commission as a superb exposition and critique of a rather poor attempt at a legal obfuscation of a complex political problem by an ad hoc commission of the European Community. This particular obfuscation, however, contributed to prolonged bloodshed. This is, no doubt, an additional reason for its exposure.

But, as I have tried to indicate, the book goes much beyond the critique of this unfortunate Commission and its rulings. It is the best introduction to the principal legal issues arising from the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation published so far.

ALEKSANDAR PAVKOVIC*

* MA (Yale), B Phil (Oxon), Dr Sci (Belgrade).
The breakup of Yugoslavia occurred as a result of a series of political upheavals and conflicts during the early 1990s. After a period of political and economic crisis in the 1980s, constituent republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia split apart, but the unresolved issues caused bitter inter-ethnic Yugoslav wars. The wars primarily affected Bosnia and Herzegovina, neighbouring parts of Croatia and, some years later, Kosovo. Some people say that with Ivan Yugoslavia would have survived. What is sure is that Milošević was an incredible carrierist without any scruples w... Can someone give me a basic explanation of the break-up of Yugoslavia? To former Yugoslavians - What are your memories when Yugoslavia got divided? Etienne Sommet. Nationalism was growing in whole Europe, and none of the nationalisms in Yugoslavia was able to prevail, since no one had more than 50% of the population or even close. Serbs were the biggest group, and in order to get more than 50%, they were ok with the fact that Slovenia and Macedonia go out of Yugoslavia, in order to get more than 50% and rule the territory called Great Serbia at the time. There are many potential explanations for the recent break-up of Yugoslavia, some canonical, others apocryphal. The ongoing trial of Slobodan Milosevic has revealed a sharp distinction between the two kinds of accounts, to the point where the trial is as much a contest of different explanations as of the accused himself. From the viewpoint of the canonical version, the trial has the advantage of making the disintegration of Yugoslavia revolve around Milosevic while shifting the focus conveniently away from the part that the Western powers played in that break-up. From the standpoint of the apo Netherlands International Law Review. Your name * Please enter your name. Your email address * Please enter a valid email address. Break-up of Yugoslavia - Free download as PDF File (.pdf), Text File (.txt) or read online for free. After the Cold War and the death of Tito, Yugoslavia breaks-up in 1991. This leads to the creation of seven independent States nowadays. referred to the Break-up. The research methods are literature review, qualitative analysis of the mass-media articles and reportage covering the conflict and the exploration of alternative. The scientific value of this paper is to fill the gap that shall describe the interconnection of. Yugoslavia collapsed because of the disintegration of the international order, by which Yugoslavia. was strongly influenced. The former Yugoslav defense secretary, General Kadijevic, argues that due to the collapse of.